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Abstract
The regulation of transnational employment in the European
Union operates at the crossroads between private
international law and internal market rules. The private
international law rules are currently laid down in the Rome I
Regulation. This regulation is complemented by the Posted
Workers Directive, a directive based on the competences of
the EU in the field of free movement of services. The current
contribution first describes the rules which determine the
law applicable to the employment contract under Article 8
Rome I Regulation and the way these rules are interpreted
by the CJEU before critically analysing these rules and the
reasoning that seems to lie behind the court’s interpretation
(section 2). The law applying to the contract is, however,
only of limited relevance for the protection of posted work-
ers. This is due inter alia to the mandatory application of
certain rules of the country to which the workers are posted,
even if a different law governs their contract. This
application of host state law is based on Article 9 Rome I
Regulation in conjunction with the Posted Workers Direc-
tive. Section 3 describes the content of these rules and the
– to some extent still undecided – interaction between the
Rome I Regulation and the PWD. The conclusion will be
that there is an uneasy match between the interests inform-
ing private international law and the interests of the internal
market, which is not likely to be resolved in the near future.
Keywords: private international law, applicable law, overrid-
ing mandatory provisions, transnational employment rela-
tions, posting of workers
1 Introduction
The regulation of labour migration is one of the key
aspects of sovereignty. Though not uncontested from a
philosophical point of view, modern states tend to con-
sider themselves exclusively competent to regulate
incoming labour migration.1 To a lesser extent, states
also may feel the need to regulate outgoing labour
* Aukje van Hoek is Professor at the University of Amsterdam.
1. On this issue: C. Nwachukwu Okeke and J.A.R. Nafziger, ‘United States
Migration Law: Essentials for Comparison’, 54 AJCL 531-52, at 534
(2006); J.F. Hollifield, ‘The Emerging Migration State’, 38 International
Migration Review 885-912, at 887 and 890-91 (2004).
migration.2 Such regulation may serve different goals:
all at the same time and to a different extent, depending
on the socio-economic circumstances.3 Generally, states
will want to control the influx and outflow of workers in
order to prevent disbalances on the labour market and
social unrest. This concern may relate purely to the
numbers of outgoing or incoming workers, e.g. when
emigration countries try to prevent a brain drain. But
also the conditions under which the internationally
mobile workforce is employed, are part of state regula-
tion in some way.
The regulation of employment conditions in migration
law may impact on the type of workers eligible for
migration, e.g. restrict the influx to workers earning
above a certain threshold wage, but this type of regula-
tion is also meant to ensure a certain measure of protec-
tion to the migrant workers themselves on the one hand
and prevent differences in employment conditions
between local workers and migrants disrupting the local
labour market on the other. However, when migration
law starts regulating employment conditions, it enters a
field also occupied by the rules of private international
law.
In the EU, labour migration is part of the internal mar-
ket. Both permanent migration and temporary posting
of workers in the context of the cross-border provision
of services are protected freedoms under the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU. This means inter alia that
administrative controls on migration are abolished,
which has also removed the protective function of
migration law. The task to protect mobile workers as
well as local labour markets against social dumping is
delegated almost exclusively to the rules on applicable
2. E.g. Act concerning placing and protection for Indonesian Workers in
Foreign Countries, cited in: I. Susanti, The Conflict Rules on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of Migrant Workers – A Proposition for Indonesia
and ASEAN (2008), at 202. See for examples of similar regulation in
Pakistan: <http:// beoe. gov. pk/ Ordinance. asp>, India: <http:// moia. gov.
in/ services. aspx ?id1= 75andid= m1andidp= 75andmainid= 73>; <http://
moia. gov. in/ pdf/ emigration_ clearance. pdf> and the Philippines: <www.
poea. gov. ph/ >.
3. For a succinct description of the goals of the Singapore regulation of
incoming labour migration see <www. mom. gov. sg/ Documents/ foreign -
manpower/ EFMA/ EFMA -Executive -summary. pdf>.
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law.4 In this chapter I will discuss these rules, in partic-
ular Articles 8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation, and the
interpretation given to these articles in the case law of
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The private
international law rules in turn will be put into the con-
text of the internal market, in particular the rules on the
free provision of services and the specification thereof in
the Posted Workers Directive (PWD).5 Due to this par-
ticular perspective, the discussion will focus on the law
of the place of work: to what extent is private interna-
tional law instrumental in guaranteeing a level playing
field. The concluding paragraph will summarise the
main points of tension both within and between the two
systems.
2 The Law Applicable to
Individual Employment
Contracts under the Rome I
Regulation
2.1 Articles 3 and 8 of the Rome I Regulation:
Content of the Provisions
The Rome I Regulation applies in all Member States of
the EU with the exception of Denmark.6 Courts of the
Member States will apply the regulation to all interna-
tional employment contracts concluded as from
17 December 2009.7 According to Article 2 the regula-
tion has universal application, which means it will apply
even when the conflict-of-law rules contained therein
declare the law of a non-Member State to be applicable
to the contract.
The Rome I Regulation is based on party autonomy.
According to Article 3 the parties to a contract may des-
ignate the law applicable to the contract themselves.
This chosen law will be the law governing the contract
– the lex causae. The regulation does not contain any
requirement as to the link between the law chosen and
the parties to the contract: it is perfectly legitimate to
4. For an overview of protective mechanisms in the EU Member States,
see A.A.H. van Hoek and M. Houwerzijl, Complementary Study on the
Legal Aspects of the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provi-
sion of Services in the European Union, Report to the European Com-
mission under Contract VC/2011/0096 (2011), at 20-28;
available at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ social/ main. jsp ?catId= 471andlangId=
en> and <www. uva. nl/ contact/ medewerkers/ item/ a. a. h. van -hoek. html ?f=
van+hoek>.
5. Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework
of the provision of services, OJ 1997 L 18/1.
6. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual
obligations (Rome I), OJ 2008, L 177/6. For the UK, see Commission
Decision of 22 December 2008 on the request from the United King-
dom to accept Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations
(Rome I) (notified under document number C(2008) 8554) OJ 2009 L
10/22–22. Denmark is party to the Rome Convention of 1980, OJ
1998, C-27/34 (consolidated version).
7. Corrigendum to Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to con-
tractual obligations (Rome I), OJ 2009, L 309/87.
choose a non-interest third country’s law as the law
applying to an international contract. The regulation
does however contain some restrictions in case the con-
tract is not truly international and/or only has links
with EU Member States. In the latter case, the choice
by the parties for the law of a non-EU state cannot prej-
udice the application of mandatory rules of EU law
applicable to the case at hand.8
More restrictions are imposed in case of so-called
‘weaker party’ contracts. For individual employment
contracts and consumer contracts a specific protection
technique is used, which ensures that the weaker party
can only profit from a choice of law in the contract and
cannot lose any protection he or she would otherwise
have enjoyed.9 Under Article 8(1) Rome I a choice of
law by the parties may not have the result of depriving
the employee of the protection afforded to him by pro-
visions that cannot be derogated from by agreement
under the law applicable in the absence of such a choice,
the ‘objectively applicable law’. Hence, in employment
conflicts it is always relevant to ascertain the objectively
applicable law, which can be done following the choice-
of-law rules in Article 8(2)-8(4) Rome I.10 This law
determines the minimum level of protection to be award-
ed to the internationally mobile worker. As such, it is
more relevant from the point of view of regulating
mobility and preventing social dumping than the free-
dom of choice offered by Article 8(1).11
According to Article 8(2) Rome I, in the absence of a
choice by the parties, an individual employment con-
tract shall be governed by the law of the country in
which or, failing that, from which the employee habitu-
ally carries out his work in performance of the contract.
The country where the work is habitually carried out
shall not be deemed to have changed if he is temporarily
employed in another country. In other words, the Rome
I Regulation focuses on the habitual place of work in
determining the applicable law. Moreover, the second
sentence of paragraph 2 creates a fiction of stability of
the habitual place of work in order to ensure that during
a temporary posting, the law applying to the contract
does not change. This posting rule applies only when
the work performed in another Member State is consid-
ered to be temporary in the meaning of the provision.
The preamble (paragraph 36) contains a specification of
the concept of ‘temporary’: ‘As regards individual
8. Article 3(4) Rome I Regulation.
9. For insurance contracts and contracts of carriage a different technique is
used: a choice of law by the parties is limited to legal systems having a
specific connection to the contract: see Articles 7(3) and 5(2) Rome I.
10. Compare CJEU 15 December 2011, C-384/10, ECR I-13275 (Voogs-
geerd v. Navimer), para. 28. When referring to case law, I will not
include comprehensive references to literature. All case notes which are
identifiable as such can be found on Eurlex – an official website of the
EU. References will be to selected literature which is deemed represen-
tative of a certain position and/or is deemed particularly useful for fur-
ther reference to literature in a specific country.
11. EU governments can not force the parties to the individual contract of
employment to enter a choice of law into their agreement as a precon-
dition for cross-border mobility. The standard form for seamen’s con-
tracts of the Philippines, however, does contain such a choice of law
provision. See footnote 2.
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employment contracts, work carried out in another
country should be regarded as temporary if the
employee is expected to resume working in the country
of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad’.12 The con-
clusion of a new contract of employment with the origi-
nal employer or an employer belonging to the same
group of companies as the original employer should not
preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying
out his work in another country temporarily.13
Article 8(3) Rome I contains an alternative reference
rule in case the country where the work is habitually
carried out cannot be identified. In that case the con-
tract shall be governed by the law of the country where
the place of business through which the employee was
engaged is situated.
Under Article 8(4) Rome I both pre-established con-
necting factors – habitual place of work and engaging
place of business – may be set aside where it appears
from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is
more closely connected with another country, in which
case the law of that other country shall apply.
2.2 The Interpretation of Article 8 Rome I: The
Case Law of the CJEU
2.2.1 Four Instruments, One Set of Concepts
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation uses the habitual
place of work as its primary connecting factor and the
engaging place of business as a secondary connecting
factor. Currently there is no case law on the interpreta-
tion of the Rome I Regulation. However, similar criteria
were used in both the rules on jurisdiction as evidenced
most recently in the Brussels I Regulation14 and the
Rome Convention, the treaty which preceded the Rome
I Regulation. On several occasions the CJEU has
stressed the continuity between the different instru-
ments as well as the cross-referential character of con-
cepts used therein.15 This ‘transposability’ of concepts is
limited to cases where the provisions are similar in
wording and function. Though the text of the provision
in the Rome I Regulation is not identical to those in the
Brussels I Regulation and the Rome Convention, this
prerequisite seems to be fulfilled with regard to con-
tracts of employment. The texts are largely identical,
and all pursue a protective purpose.16 The main novelty
of the Rome I Regulation – the introduction of the
12. This seems to limit the concept of posting by requiring previous
employment in the country of origin as well as the intention to return
there.
13. This seems to extend the notion of posting to include situations in
which a contract of employment is entered into with a local employer in
the host country. Compare the facts of the case in CJEU 10 April 2003,
C-437/00, ECR I-3573 (Pugliese).
14. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (Brussels I), OJ 2001 L 12/1-23, Article 19.
15. Compare CJEU 7 December 2010, Joined Cases 585/08 and 144/09,
ECR I-12527 (Pammer and Alpenhof) with note by the author in 1
European Review of Contract Law 93-107, at 97 (2012).
16. Compare Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (Brussels I), OJ 12/1, preamble para. 13
and Regulation Rome I, preamble para. 23.
country ‘from which’ the work is habitually performed
as a (secondary) connecting factor – is explicitly based
on the preexisting case law on the Brussels
Convention.17 And finally, the CJEU repeatedly refers
to its own case law on the old rules on jurisdiction in its
judgments on both the new jurisdiction rules and the
rules on applicable law.18 Hence, the interpretation of
the concept ‘habitual place of work’ in the Rome Con-
vention is also relevant for the interpretation of the same
concept in the Rome I Regulation and the interpretation
given in the context of the rules on jurisdiction is also
relevant in the context of applicable law.19 As the juris-
diction regime is already quite old (the first treaty being
entered into in 1968), there is ample case law on the
interpretation thereof. There is far less case law on
applicable law. However, of the five rulings the CJEU
has given on the interpretation of the Rome Convention,
three relate directly to the law applying to an individual
employment contract.20 These three cases will be dis-
cussed below.
2.2.2 The Habitual Place of Work in the Case Law on
Jurisdiction: The Country ‘Where or from Which’
Under the reign of the Brussels Convention, the CJEU
(then called ECJ) developed a protective rule of jurisdic-
tion for contracts of employment within the general
rules on contracts in Article 5(1). This rule attributed
jurisdiction to the court for the place where the employ-
ee habitually carries out his work.21 This judge-made
rule was integrated in the text of the Convention at the
occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal in
198922 and included in a special section when the Con-
vention was transposed into the Brussels I Regulation.
In this process, the protective character of the rule
remained intact, but the focus shifted from a bilateral
rule aimed at Gleichlauf – giving jurisdiction to a court
which could apply its own system of labour law includ-
17. COM(2005)650 final, p. 7.
18. For an early reference, with regard to the continuity between the old
case law and the new text of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention,
see CJEU 9 January 1997, C-383/95, ECR I-57 1997 (Rutten v. Cross
Medical), para. 21. For a cross-reference between the Brussels I and
Rome I Regulations, see CJEU 15 March 2011, C-29/10, ECR I-1595
(Heiko Koelzsch v. Luxembourg), para. 33.
19. See more extensively on this point V. Parisot, 'Vers une coherence verti-
cale des textes communataires en droit du travail? Réflexion autour des
arrêts Heiko Koelzsch et Jan Voogsgeerd de la Cour de justice', Journal
de Droit International 139, 597-645 (2012); A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘Heiko
Koelzsch tegen Groothertogdom Luxemburg’, 60 Ars Aequi, 650-58, at
652 (2011) and the case note on Pammer (above n. 15) with referen-
ces. On the issue of the interpretation method, see also E. Pataut, case
note to Voogsgeerd, 101 Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 3,
647-66, at 658 (2012) with references to French literature.
20. This could be an indication of the societal relevance of the question at
hand, as well as of the problems of interpretation caused by Article 6
Rome Convention/Article 8 Rome I Regulation.
21. In the case of Six Constructions v. Humbert (15 February 1989, Case
32/88, ECR 341), the ECJ refused to use to place of establishment of
the employer as an alternative ground for jurisdiction in a case in which
the place of work was located outside the (then) EEC because this
ground of jurisdiction would not serve the protection of the worker.
22. Convention of 26 May 1989 (89/535/EEC), Article 4. A similar rule was
already introduced in the Lugano Convention of 1988 (PB 1988, L
319/9). Both conventions also introduced the secondary reference to
the engaging place of business.
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ing the locally applicable collective agreements23 – to a
unilateral rule offering the employee easy access to a
nearby court.24 To reach the desired protective result,25
the ‘habitual place of work’ was interpreted in a factual
manner, referring to the actual performance of the con-
tract rather than the contractual arrangements.26 More-
over, the CJEU expanded the concept to also include
cases in which the worker performed activities in more
than one country. According to the case law, as it cur-
rently stands, the habitual place of work does not only
refer to the place in which the work is habitually per-
formed but also to the place from which the employee
principally discharges his obligations towards his
employer.27
The determination of the place of work involves a
detailed assessment of facts. In case of a sales represen-
tative working in different countries, the national court
should try to determine in which place the employee has
established the effective centre of his working
activities.28 When the employee carries out a large part
of his work in the country in which he has established
his office, that country is deemed to be the country in or
from which the work is habitually performed. However,
if a worker is sent to different locations to perform one
and the same activity (cooking on oil rigs on the conti-
nental shelf for example), no such effective centre of
working activities can be determined nor can any quali-
tative criterion be used to determine the ‘essential’ part
of the performance. In that case, the relevant criterion
for establishing an employee’s habitual place of work is
the place where he spends most of his working time
engaged on his employer’s business.29 In principle the
whole duration of the contract should be taken into
account, unless there is a clear intention on the side of
23. See ECJ 26 May 1982, Case 133/81, ECR 1891 (Ivenel v. Schwab)
paras. 12-15; ECJ 15 January 1985, Case 266/85, ECR 239 (Shenavai v.
Kreischer) para. 16; ECJ 15 February 1989, Case 32/88 ECR 341 (Six
Constructions v. Humbert) para. 10 and CJEU 13 July 1993, C-125/92
(Mulox IBC v. Geels) para. 15.
24. CJEU 13 July 1993, C-125/92 (Mulox IBC v. Geels) para. 19. CJEU 27
February 2002, C-37/00, ECR 2002, I-2013 (Weber v. Universal Ogden
Services), para. 40. It is interesting to note that these changes did not
deter the CJEU from referring to the old case law for the interpretation
of the current text.
25. On the protective character of the interpretation given to the rules on
jurisdiction, see Parisot 2012, above n. 19, at 620. For a cricical analysis
thereof, see U. Grušić, 'Jurisdiction in Employment Matters under the
Brussels I Regulation: A Reassessment', 61 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 1, 91-126 (2012).
26. See for example CJEU 27 February 2002, C-37/00, ECR I-2013 (Her-
bert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services Ltd) para. 58 and A. Winter-
ling, Die Entscheidungszuständigkeit in Arbeitssachen im europäischen
Zivilverfahrensrecht 2005, at 61-62.
27. CJEU 13 July 1993, C-125/92 (Mulox IBC v. Geels), paras. 20 and 26.
Compare CJEU 10 April 2003, C-437/00, ECR 2003, I-3573 (Pugliese),
para. 19 which refers to the place where or from which the employee in
fact performed the essential part of his duties towards his employer.
Neither the text of the Brussels Convention (as changed by the Conven-
tion of 1989) nor the text of the Brussels I Regulation contain a refer-
ence to the place from which the work is habitually performed.
28. CJEU 9 January 1997, C- 383/95, ECR 1997, I-57 (Rutten v. Cross
Medical), para. 23.
29. CJEU 27 February 2002, C-37/00, ECR 2002, I-2013 (Weber v. Univer-
sal Ogden Services), para. 50.
both parties to change the place of work, in which case
only the most recent place of work will be relevant.30
2.2.3 The Hierarchy between the Habitual Place of Work
and the Engaging Place of Business: Koelzsch and
Voogsgeerd
The extensive interpretation which the CJEU has given
to the concept of ‘habitual place of work’ in the context
of the rules on jurisdiction is continued in the case law
on the Rome Convention. In two cases the CJEU dealt
with the identification of the place of work in interna-
tional transport (by road and sea, respectively). These
cases are of particular interest as the applicable law to
employment in the transport sector is traditionally
linked to the place of establishment of the employer
and/or the flag of the vessel on which the work is per-
formed.31 In the Commission’s proposal for the Rome I
Regulation, the introduction of the place from which the
work is performed in the connecting factor was deemed
to be particularly relevant for personnel working on
board aircraft.32 However, the explanatory memoran-
dum was not conclusive as to whether the extensive
interpretation was already deemed to be valid under the
Rome Convention nor on the applicability of the exten-
ded rule to other modes of transportation.
In the Koelzsch and Voogsgeerd cases, the CJEU basically
rejects the primacy of the traditional connection to the
place of establishment of the employer while totally
ignoring the flag as a relevant factor.33 The court stress-
es that the reference to the engaging place of business in
the Rome Convention is strictly secondary.34 Even in
the case of a truck driver working in international trans-
port (Koelzsch) or a sailor working on a seagoing vessel
(Voogsgeerd), the national court should try to establish
whether, based on the circumstances as a whole, a coun-
try can be identified where or from which the work is
30. Id., paras. 52-54.
31. O. Deinert, Internationales Arbeitsrecht, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013,
165 ff.; Parisot, above n. 19, at 624. See for a discussion of this issue in
the context of the liberalization of the transport markets in the EU:
A.A.H. van Hoek, 'Het toepasselijk recht op arbeidsovereenkomsten
– Een reactie op het Groenboek EVO', Paper submitted to the
European Commission <http:// ec. europa. eu/ justice/ newsroom/ civil/
opinion/ 040127_ en. htm>, published in Sociaal Recht, at 365-79 (2003)
with references.
32. COM(2005)650 final, p. 7.
33. In the Voogsgeerd case no mention is made of the flag(s) of the ships
on which Voogsgeerd performed his work. Admittedly, the flag was not
brought forward as a relevant connecting factor by any of the parties to
the procedure. Neither was the connection to the habitual place of
work, though. See on this issue P. Winkler von Mohrenfels, ‘Zur objek-
tiven Anknüpfung des Arbeitsvertragesstatuts im internationalen Seear-
beitsrecht: gewöhnlicher Arbeitsort, Flagge und einstellende Niederlas-
sung’, 5 Europäische Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 368-80, at 373-77
(2012); U. Grušić, ‘Should the Connecting Factor of the "Engaging
Place of Business Be Abolished in Private International Law?’, 62 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 173-92, at 180-81 (2013)
and A.A.H. van Hoek, ‘Het toepasselijk recht op arbeidsovereenkoms-
ten in de zeevaart – Een commentaar op HvJ EU 15 december 2011,
case C-384/10, Voogsgeerd/Navimer’, 7 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Europees Recht 245-51 (2012).
34. CJEU 15 March 2011, C-29/10, ECR 2011, I-01595 (Koelzsch v. Lux-
embourg), and CJEU 15 December 2011, C-394/10, ECR I-13275
(Voogsgeerd v. Navimer) and in particular Voogsgeerd, paras. 34-35.
Compare also above n. 21.
160
ELR November 2014 | No. 3
actually performed.35 The CJEU justifies this broad
interpretation of the primary connecting factor by refer-
ring to the protective character of the provision on the
law applying to individual contracts of employment: ‘It
follows that, in so far as the objective of Article 6 of the
Rome Convention is to guarantee adequate protection
for the employee, that provision must be understood as
guaranteeing the applicability of the law of the State in
which he carries out his working activities rather than
that of the State in which the employer is established. It
is in the former State that the employee performs his
economic and social duties and, as was noted by the
Advocate General in point 50 of her Opinion, it is there
that the business and political environment affects
employment activities. Therefore, compliance with the
employment protection rules provided for by the law of
that country must, so far as is possible, be guaranteed’.36
When ascertaining the place of work in case of interna-
tional transport (including international shipping), the
national courts must take account of all the factors
which characterise the activity of the employee. These
are, in particular, the place from which the employee
carries out his transport tasks, receives instructions con-
cerning his tasks and organises his work and the place
where his work tools are situated.37 Additionally, the
court must determine the places where the transport is
principally carried out, where the goods are unloaded
and the place to which the employee returns after com-
pletion of his tasks.38 Only when it is not possible to
identify the country in or from which the work is habit-
ually performed, recourse may be had to the second
connecting factor, the engaging place of business.39 For
the determination of the latter place, the situation at the
time of recruitment is relevant, not the actual perform-
ance of the contract.40
2.2.4 The Closer Connection: Schlecker
In the Voogsgeerd case the CJEU seems to be aware of
the fact that the place in which the engaging place of
business is situated may not present a relevant connect-
ing factor from a socio-economical point of view.41 In
this context, the court refers to the possibility to ignore
35. CJEU 15 March 2011, C-29/10, ECR 2011, I-01595 (Koelzsch v. Lux-
embourg), paras. 47-49.
36. Id., para. 42.
37. CJEU 15 March 2011, C-29/10, ECR 2011, I-01595 (Koelzsch v. Lux-
embourg), paras. 48-49, CJEU 15 December 2011, C-394/10 (Voogs-
geerd v. Navimer), para. 38.
38. CJEU 15 March 2011, C-29/10, ECR 2011, I-01595 (Koelzsch v. Lux-
embourg), paras. 48-49. CJEU 15 December 2011, C-394/10, ECR
I-13275 (Voogsgeerd v. Navimer), paras. 38-39.
39. CJEU 15 December 2011, C-394/10, ECR I-13275 (Voogsgeerd v.
Navimer), paras. 32-35.
40. The identification of the habitual place of work is left to the national
courts. But in both the Koelzsch and the Voogsgeerd cases it is clear
from the facts of the case that there was no relevant link between the
actual performance of the contract by the employee and the country of
establishment of the employer. The German truck-driver operated from
Germany, the Dutch sailor from Antwerp (BE); both were employed by
a Luxembourg company.
41. As I am mainly interested in the socio-economic, regulatory function of
the conflicts-rule, I will not discuss the connection to the engaging place
of business in any detail. See on this issue: Grušić, above n. 33 at 190.
the presumptions referring to the habitual place of work
and the engaging place of business when based on an
assessment of the circumstances of the case, the national
court finds the contract to be more closely connected to
another country. The possibility to use this ‘escape
clause’, which is currently regulated in Article 8(4)
Rome I, was the object of the most recent preliminary
question regarding the law applying to individual
employment contracts which was answered in the
Schlecker case.42
The Schlecker case concerned a conflict between a
German employee (Ms Boedeker) and her German
employer (the Schlecker company), caused by the deci-
sion of the employer to terminate employment in the
Netherlands and re-instate the employee in a different
position in Germany. For the last twelve years (of a total
of twenty-seven years of service), the employee had
been employed as manager of the Dutch division of the
employer, supervising its 300 local branches. There was
no contestation as to the fact that the Netherlands was
the habitual place of work.43 The employee relied on the
application of Dutch law, which in this case offered her
better protection than German law. However, the
employer claimed that the contract was more closely
related to Germany. Elements referring to Germany
where inter alia the nationality and place of domicile of
both parties, the language and original currency of the
contract, reference to provision of German law in the
contract and the fact that the employee was covered by
German tax law, social security and additional pension
schemes. Could the Dutch court in this case ignore the
connection based on the place of work in favour of Ger-
man law?
In the Dutch case which led to the preliminary ques-
tion, Advocate General Strikwerda had stressed the pro-
tective character of using the habitual place of work as
the primary connecting factor. Due to this specific char-
acter, the advocate general concluded that the escape
clause based on a closer connection should be used spar-
ingly when used in competition with the habitual place
of work.44 This view seems to be supported by the
employee, Austria and the European Commission in
their submissions to the CJEU.45 The employee also
claimed that the escape clause of Article 8(4) Rome I
should be used to apply the law most favourable to the
employee. In contrast, the Dutch government favoured
an interpretation in which also in this case the law of the
habitual place of work may be replaced by a law that is
more closely connected to the contract at hand.
In its judgment the CJEU sides with the Dutch govern-
ment. The habitual place of work does take priority over
42. CJEU 12 September 2013, C-64/12 (Schlecker v. Boedeker), nyr.
43. Id., para. 27.
44. For a similar position, see L. Merrett, Employment Contracts in Private
International Law (2011), at 206 and 209. For the original judgment,
see Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 3 February 2012, Case No.
10/01806, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BS8791 (available at: <www. rechtspraak.
nl>), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2012), 90.
45. CJEU 12 September 2013, C-64/12 (Schlecker v. Boedeker), nyr, para.
19.
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the engaging place of business, based on the protective
character of the first connecting factor. No such hierar-
chy exists, however, with regard to the escape clause
referring to the closest connection. Though the national
court must first determine the applicable law by refer-
ence to the pre-established connecting factors, it is for
the national court to disregard these connecting factors
and to apply the law of another country, where it is
apparent from the circumstances as a whole that the
employment contract is more closely connected with
that country. Both connecting factors are put on the
same footing in this regard.46 The court does, however,
specifically reject the assumption that the escape clause
may be used to offer better protection to the employee.47
The closer connection test cannot be performed by sim-
ply counting connecting factors: not all connecting fac-
tors carry the same weight. According to the CJEU
‘among the significant factors suggestive of a connection
with a particular country, account should be taken in
particular of the country in which the employee pays
taxes on the income from his activity and the country in
which he is covered by a social security scheme and pen-
sion, sickness insurance and invalidity schemes. In addi-
tion, the national court must also take account of all the
circumstances of the case, such as the parameters relat-
ing to salary determination and other working condi-
tions.’48 The content of the relevant laws is not decisive
in this matter.
Accordingly, the primacy given to the habitual place of
work in Article 8(2) Rome I is meant to ensure that
employees enjoy the levels of protection that prevail in
their socio-economic environment. Article 8 Rome I as a
whole however seems to be based on the closest connec-
tion rule.49
2.3 Some Problems and Controversies as to the
Application of Article 8 Rome I
2.3.1 The Principles Underlying Article 8 Rome I
The preamble to the Rome I Regulation contains several
indications as to the principles underlying the system of
conflict rules contained therein. In general, the
regulation aims to ensure predictability of the outcome
of litigation and certainty as to the law applicable to a
contractual obligation. Both goals are served by deci-
sional harmony: a situation in which the same choice-of-
law result is reached in all Member State courts.50 In
order to achieve decisional harmony, the rules contained
in the regulation should be highly foreseeable, while
retaining a certain degree of flexibility.51
Party autonomy is deemed to be one of the cornerstones
of the system. However, parties regarded as weaker are
46. Id., paras. 35-36.
47. Id., para. 34.
48. Id., para. 41.
49. Compare H. Verschueren, ‘Toepasselijk arbeidsrecht in grensoverschrij-
dende situaties: overzicht en knelpunten van Europese rechtsregels en
rechtspraak’, in H. Verschueren and M.S. Houwerzijl (red.), Toepasselijk
arbeidsrecht over de grenzen heen (2009), at 18.
50. Preamble Rome I Regulation para. 6.
51. Id., para. 16.
protected by special conflict-of-law rules that are more
favourable to their interests.52 This means inter alia that
employees should not be deprived of the protection
afforded to them by provisions that are mandatory or
unilaterally binding on the employer.53 This poses a
restriction on the effect of a choice of law by the parties.
However, the preamble contains no information as to
the way the special protection of employees affects the
law applicable in the absence of such a choice.
2.3.2 Adequate or Better Protection?
One point of discussion is whether Article 8 Rome I
Regulation allows the court to take into account which
law is most favourable to the employee. In other words,
does the Rome I Regulation strive for (merely) adequate
protection of workers or (rather) better protection? With
regard to the meaning of Article 8(1) Rome I, the major-
ity opinion seems to hold that the law chosen by the
parties applies to the contract in full, except when man-
datory rules of the otherwise applicable law would pro-
vide the worker better protection.54 In the latter case,
the employee will be protected by the law which offers
the better protection. In choice-of-law terms, the favor-
principle informs the application of paragraph 1.55
In contrast, the more favourable law argument does not
seem to be relevant for the outcome of the choice-of-law
consideration under Article 8(2)–(4) Rome I.56 Which
country is deemed to be the country in or from which
the work is habitually performed should be assessed on
an objective basis; the protection offered by the systems
involved should not influence the outcome of this con-
sideration. A similar argument is put forward with
regard to the establishment of a closer connection under
Article 8(4) Rome I. Though occasionally authors have
proposed to use the ‘escape clause’ to apply the law
52. Id., paras. 11 and 23.
53. Id., para. 35.
54. AG Trstenjak, Opinion to Voogsgeerd, para. 48; AG Wahl, Opinion to
Schlecker para. 24; Deinert, above n. 31 at 96, Rn 2, 102, Rn 13 and
128 Rn 62; Merrett, above n. 44 at 215; P. Mankowski and O.L. Knö-
fel, ‘On the Road Again oder: wo arbeitet ein Fernfahrer’, 4 Europäi-
sche Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 521-36, at 524 (2011); Winkler von
Mohrenfels, above n. 33 at 371. The opposing view would grant a
choice of law in a contract of employment only substantive effect
– comparable to the effect of a choice of law in non-international con-
tracts under Article 3 para. 3. See inter alia L. Strikwerda, Inleiding tot
het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht (2012), at 173, para. 175.
This would mean that the chosen law only applies in as far as it doesn’t
deviate from mandatory provisions of the otherwise applicable law. The
CJEU has not taken up a clear position on this issue yet, see Koelzsch,
para. 35 and Voogsgeerd, para. 28.
55. I will not deal extensively with the discussion as to the exact interpreta-
tion and application of Article 8(1) as this issue is of minor relevance for
the specific focus of this article – which is the regulatory function of pri-
vate international law.
56. See on the majority opinion, AG Wahl, Opinion to Schlecker, paras, 32,
36-37; Deinert, above n. 31 at 122, Rn 50; 131 Rn 68; 155 Rn 128
with references and 161 Rn 143.
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which offers the best protection to employees,57 this
point of view is specifically rejected by the CJEU in the
Schlecker case. The favor-principle is only to be used in
the context of a choice of law by the parties.
2.3.3 Adequate Protection and the Relative Weight of the
Habitual Place of Work
But the controversy does not end with this conclusion.
The Schlecker case brought to the fore that different
agents may hold quite divergent views on the concept of
‘adequate protection’. In the Koelzsch and Voogsgeerd
cases, the CJEU stressed that the rules on applicable law
should submit the contract of employment to the law of
the state in which the employee performs his economic
and social duties because it is in this country that the
business and political environment affects employment
activities. In jurisprudence this mechanism, in which
certain weaker parties are protected by applying the law
of their social and economic environment, is referred to
as the ‘protection principle’ or ‘functional allocation’.
This terminology is common in Dutch private interna-
tional law,58 which may explain the position of the
Dutch Advocate General Strikwerda in the Schlecker
case. In Dutch legal writing, the reference to the locus
laboris in Article 8(2) Rome I Regulation is seen as the
embodiment of the protective character of the choice-
of-law rule. Accordingly, a deviation from the locus
laboris rule in cases in which the social and economic
environment of the employment can be clearly estab-
lished can be deemed to counteract the protective func-
tion of the rule.59
In his opinion before the CJEU, Advocate General
Wahl takes a totally different view on the protective
character of Article 8 Rome I. Protection is given mainly
by limiting the freedom of the parties to choose the
applicable law.60 If any protection is to be had from the
choice of law rules that apply in the absence of such a
choice, it consists of a strict adherence to the proximity
rule.61 In this view, the employee is protected by apply-
ing the law that is most familiar to her. Which in the
case of Ms Boedeker (the employee in the Schlecker
57. See for example V. van den Eeckhout, ‘Navigeren door artikel 6 EVO-
verdrag c.q. artikel 8 Rome I-Verordening: mogelijkheden tot sturing
van toepasselijk arbeidsrecht’, 9 Arbeidsrechtelijke Annotaties, at 55
(2010) and ‘Enkele beschouwingen naar aanleiding van diverse recente
Europese en Nederlandse uitspraken in het internationaal arbeidsrecht
(Koelzsch, Voogsgeerd, Vicoplus, Nuon-rechtspraak en de zaak FNV/De
Mooij). Welke (nieuwe) argumentatiemogelijkheden voor werknemers
tot opeisen van (meer) arbeidsrechtelijke bescherming in internationale
situaties?’, ARBAC (<www. arbac. nl>) (2012). Some authors have com-
mented that a certain element of ‘favor’ may be applied in practice,
especially when the lex fori is also the more favourable law: see Dein-
ert, above n. 31, at 155-56, Rn 128 and 130 and Pataut (2012), above
n. 19, at 660-61.
58. See in particular Th.M. de Boer, ‘The Purpose of Uniform Choice of Law
Rules: The Rome II Regulation’, 56 Netherlands international Law
Review, 295-332, at 298 and 316 (2009) and Th.M.de Boer, ‘The EEC
Contracts Convention and the Dutch Courts: A Methodological Per-
spective’, 54 Rabels Zeitschrift 25-62 (1990).
59. This seems to be the French position as well: Deinert, above n. 31, at
156 Rn 129.
60. Opinion delivered on 16 April 2013, para. 25.
61. Id., para. 26.
case) would be the law of her country of origin and
domicile, rather than her country of work. Advocate
General Wahl even argues that the protection of the
employee is served by an extensive interpretation of the
escape clause, because in that case the search for the
closest connection is given precedence over legal cer-
tainty and predictability.
Hence, the two Advocates General adhere to strongly
diverging views on the effect of the alleged protective
character of Article 8 Rome I on the interpretation of its
provisions. Moreover, they reach opposing conclusions
as to the desirability to deviate from the law of the
habitual place of work.62 Advocate General Wahl seems
to adhere to a classic pattern in which the choice-of-law
rules are geared to protect outgoing expatriates against
the lower level of protection offered by the states to
which they are posted.63 Moreover, the broad use of the
closer connection rule emphasises the individual charac-
ter of the choice-of-law process. The priority given by
Advocate General Strikwerda to the country of work
emphasises the collective element of protection of work-
ers and fits into a trend focusing on equal protection of
all workers on the labour market of a given state – a
trend which is very present in the discussion on intra-
EU migration and the posting of workers.64 The
Schlecker case feeds directly into this debate.
In the Koelzsch and Voogsgeerd cases, the CJEU stressed
the priority of the habitual place of work over the place
62. V. van den Eeckhout, De ontsnappingsclausule van artikel 6 lid 2 slot
EVO Verdrag (artikel 8 lid 4 Rome I Verordening). Hoe bijzonder is de
zaak Schlecker? (2013), 5-8, Paper available at: <http:// papers. ssrn.
com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2364358>. This difference may also
embody the controversy between flexibility and justice in the individual
case on the one hand versus legal certainty and predictability on the
other – compare Deinert, above n. 31 at 156 Rn 131. In the Commis-
sion proposal for the Rome I Regulation, COM(2005)650final, the
proper law escape was deleted from Article 4, as a means to foster legal
certainty in the internal market. However, the escape clause was
reintroduced in the legislative process and is part of the final version of
Article 4 of the regulation. The Commission did not propose to remove
the escape clause from the provision on employment contracts. In the
final text of the Rome I Regulation, deviation from the standard con-
necting factor is mandated when there is a closer connection to another
country in case of employment contracts. Article 4 of the same requires
a manifestly closer connection.
63. In para. 43 of his conclusion, the AG gives the example of a French
employee of a French company who is posted in Saudi Arabia for a
period of ten years. P. Stone (EU Private International Law (2010), at
358) even suggests a ‘discriminatory’ reading of Article 8(4) in which
the escape clause is used liberally when European employees are posted
to non-EU countries but sparingly in case of posting within the EU.
Compare J.H. Even, ‘Het toepasselijke recht op arbeidsovereenkomsten.
Artikel 6 EVO en 8 Rome I steeds verder ontrafeld’, 1 Nederlands Inter-
nationaal Privaatrecht 13-24 (2013); P.R. Beaumont and P.E. McEleavy
(A.E. Anton’s Private International Law (2011), at 535) describe a simi-
lar intention informing the international scope rule of UK statutes. Com-
pare on this issue also A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van
werknemers, een onderzoek naar de interactie tussen arbeidsrecht, EG-
recht en IPR aan de hand van de detacheringsrichtlijn (2000), at 230
and 296-97.
64. See below and EU Procedure file 2012/0061/COD, inter alia the debate
in Council of 21/6/2012 and 6/12/2012. It is interesting to note that
already in the 1972 proposal of the European Commission on the law
applicable to intra-EU labour mobility (OJ 1972, C 49/26) the place of
work played a predominant role and the possibility to deviate from
application of the lex loci laboris was limited to specific situations.
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of establishment of the employer. The latter place may
not have a real and relevant connection to the actual
performance of the work, especially as within the EU
the employer enjoys freedom of establishment and free
movement services. As a result, within the EU, the
place of establishment of a transport company does not
have to bear any relation to the place where the trans-
port services are actually performed. Cheap airlines are
a case in point, but transport by road also gives rise to
‘flags of convenience’. By focusing on the effective per-
formance of the contract of employment, the CJEU
seems to counter the negative effects the employers’
freedom of establishment may have on the protection of
the employee.65 Moreover, by specifically denying any
priority for the place of establishment of the employer,
the court implicitly rejects the existence of a home
country control rule with regard to contracts of employ-
ment.66
However, by given a broad interpretation of the possi-
bility to deviate from the law of the habitual place of
work in favour of another law, the CJEU seems – to a
certain extent – to undo the effect of the decisions in
Koelzsch and Voogsgeerd. The escape rule of Article 8(4)
undermines the general applicability of the law of the
habitual place of work. Based on the criteria which are
deemed to be relevant in establishing a closer connec-
tion, this other law will usually be the law of common
origin.67 Accordingly, in effect the rule established by
the CJEU in the Schlecker case (when interpreted exten-
sively) may be quite similar to a home country control
rule.68 This highly political aspect is, however, not
reflected in the judgment of the CJEU, which squarely
sides with Advocate General Wahl.69
2.3.4 The Circumstances of the Case
Both the determination of the habitual place of work
under Article 8(2) Rome I and the establishment of a
closer connection under Article 8(4) Rome I may
require a comprehensive assessment of facts. Whereas
the place of work is established on the basis of the facts
regarding the performance of the contract, the closer
connection also relies on other factors, such as the tax
and social insurance position of the worker and the con-
tractual arrangements made by the parties. With this
65. Compare Mankowski and Knöfel, above n. 54, at 526; Pataut, above
19, at 663-64. Parisot (above n. 19 at 628) seems more neutral about
the using the establishment of the employer as a connecting factor. This
argument is elaborated by the current author (with references) in Van
Hoek, Ars Aequi, above n. 19, at 653-54 and 656.
66. The ruling of the CJEU in the Viking case (11 December 2007,
C-438/05, ECR I-10779) suggested otherwise. See more extensively on
this issue (with references): A.A.H. van Hoek and M.S. Houwerzijl,
'Loonconcurrentie als motor van de interne markt? Een tweeluik – Deel
1: De arresten Viking, Laval en Rueffert, verdragsaspecten', 14:7/8
Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 190-205.
67. Compare Regulation 883/2004 , OJ 2004 L 166/1, Articles 11(3)(a),
12(1) and 16(1).
68. This is particularly true in cases in which employer and employee do
have a common origin. Cases of ‘irregular posting’ may not demon-
strate this fact pattern. See Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, above n. 4, at 75.
69. On the wider political aspects of the Rome I Regulation, see P. Man-
kowski, Interessenpolitik und europäisches Kollisionsrecht. Rechtspoli-
tische Überlegungen zur Rom I- und zur Rom II-Verordnung (2011).
strong reliance on the circumstances of the case, the
CJEU takes position in the eternal tension between flex-
ibility and certainty in choice of law. Again, this choice
is not without contestation.
With regard to the habitual place of work, the CJEU
justifies its decision on the basis of the protection of the
worker. Even the mobile employee should be protected
by a law which has a real and relevant connection to the
factual performance of his work. The merits of this
approach are described in the previous paragraph. How-
ever, the position of the CJEU also has considerable
drawbacks. Whereas the engaging place of business of
the employer usually offers a clear-cut, easy-to-apply
connecting factor,70 the habitual place of work can be a
source of fierce contestation. In the Koelzsch case, the
Advocate General refers to the need to study the duty
roster (Körselsrapport) in order to assess the exact time
and place of work. In reality, things may even be more
complicated than that when official rosters do not match
the actual deployment of the workers. This raises com-
plex issues of civil procedure: who bears the procedural
risk and the burden of proof as regards the connecting
factors of private international law?71 Moreover, due to
the factual character of the assessment, different courts
may reach different conclusions in similar cases, which
reduces legal certainty.72 In Belgium, different courts
have reached contrary conclusions as to the question of
whether Ryan Air pilots deployed from Charleroi,
Belgium, can be deemed to habitually work in or from
Belgium.73 The issue is similarly contested in France,
despite the firm position of the French government as to
the ‘French’ character of work performed from the local
bases of low-cost foreign airlines.74
Problems relating to the exact operationalisation of the
concept of ‘habitual place of work’ in the case of trans-
port by air may be solved in time, when the criteria for
assessing the place of work in that particular sector of
the labour market become more clearly established. The
problems in road transport may be more persistent inter
70. Parisot, above n. 19 at 630. Contra: Grušić, above n. 33.
71. Mankowski and Knöfel, above n. 54, at 534 with references.
72. Parisot, above n. 19, at 637 ff; Th.M. de Boer, ‘Note to Weber’, 337
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2005). In his Opinion in the Weber case,
C-37/00, delivered on 18 October 2001, AG Jacobs already identified
the need for extensive factual information when assessing the place of
work in cases such as the Weber case.
73. Verschueren, above n. 49, at 21; Judgments adhering to the airport as
local base: Arbeidsrechtbank Charleroi (Labour Court) 21 March 2005,
JTT 2005, 264 and Arbeidshof (Court of Appeal) Brussel 10 June 2008,
3 Tijdschrift@ipr. be (2008), 44 v. judgments denying a locus base in Bel-
gium Arbeidshof Bergen (Court of Appeal) 7 September 2007, JLMB
2007, 1512 and Arbeidsrechtbank Charleroi 4 November 2013 (unpub-
lished). For comments on the latter case, see Van Calster, <http://
gavclaw. com/ 2013/ 11/ 13/ ceci -nest -pas -une -base -ryanair -the -court -in -
charleroi -on -place -where -the -employee -habitually -carries -out -his -work/ >
and <www. cne -gnc. be/ cmsfiles/ file/ A/ CNE/ PRESSE/ 2014 -01 -21%20
COMMUNIQUE%20DE%20PRESSE%20Ryanair%20paie%20ses
%20lois%20sociales%20en%20Belgique. pdf>; <www. cne -gnc. be/ cms
files/ file/ A/ CNE/ PRESSE/ 2013 -11 -08%20COMMUNIQUE%20DE
%20PRESSE%20Ceci%20n’est%20pas%20une%20base%20Ryanair.
pdf>.
74. Parisot, above n. 19, at 643-44. See also <www. telegraph. co. uk/ finance/
newsbysector/ transport/ 10350997/ Ryanair -to -appeal -6. 7m -fine -for -
breaking -French -labour -laws. html>.
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alia because of the more individualistic character of the
work performance: truck drivers do not operate in crews
and are not bound to a very specific infrastructure (air-
ports, seaports) for the start and finish of the transport
activity.75 This does not only cause problems of proof,
but may also lead to a more individualised protection of
the workers involved. Due to the purely secondary rele-
vance of the engaging place of business, it is no longer
evident that all workers employed by a single transport
company are covered by the same law.76 In transport by
road, even a common base from which a group of work-
ers (a ‘crew’) is employed, might be missing. This strict
individualisation of the applicable law (and hence
employment conditions) can seriously hamper the
possibility for the workers to protect their interests in a
collective manner. But the individual character of the
assessment may also make other, administrative and col-
lective, modes of protection and enforcement more
problematic.77 In this respect, the purely individual con-
tractual approach of private international law may be at
odds with a regulatory approach in which individual
private law protection is closely interrelated with public
law and collective modes of protection.
2.4 The Limited Relevance of the Lex Causae
In the private international law debate a lot of emphasis
is placed on the interpretation of the connecting factors
in the choice-of-law rule of Article 8 Rome I. However,
the law applying to the employment contract as such is
only one aspect of workers’ protection.78 As discussed in
the introduction, within the EU local protection for for-
eign workers is no longer a part of the law of migration.
But the country where the work is actually performed
may try to set certain standards for all work performed
within the territory by other means. Many rules of
labour protection carry administrative or criminal sanc-
tions and are supervised by labour inspectorates. The
rules may be directed to the employer but also to the
overseer of the workplace or the main contractor, inde-
pendent of any direct contractual relationship with the
75. Compare Hof Den Bosch (Court of Appeal) 28 May 2013,
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:CA1457, JAR 2013/159, RAR 2013/160 (Mooy)
and Hof Den Bosch (Court of Appeal) 10 April 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:
2007:BB2826, NIPR 2007, 292.
76. Merrett, above n. 44, at 176 describes the importance attached under
English common law to the application of one and the same law to all
workers employed by a single employer in a single location. This was
deemed to be a matter of equality. Also the right to choose the applica-
ble law to the individual contract is assessed critically against this need
for equal treatment (id. at 214). The importance of a single law apply-
ing to the entire workforce of a undertaking is also mentioned specifi-
cally by Mankowski and Knöfel, above n. 54, at 525.
77. See for a more detailed discussion on the relevance of public law and
collective methods of protection: A.A.H. van Hoek and M.S. Houwerzijl,
Comparative Study on the Legal Aspects of the Posting of Workers in
the Framework of the Provision of Services in the European Union
(2011), Report to the European Commission under contract VT/
2009/0541 (2011), at 21. To be found at: <http:// ec. europa. eu/ social/
main. jsp ?catId= 471andlangId= en>. See on the impact of collective
labour law on the choice of law position taken by individual authors,
Van Hoek, above n. 63, at 226-27.
78. See inter alia P. Mankowski, 'Die Rom I-Verordnung – Änderungen im
europäischen IPR für Schuldverträge', 4 IHR, at 146 with references
(2008).
workers concerned. Likewise, the unions in the host
state may try to protect posted workers by persuading
the employer to enter into a collective agreement on
their behalf. These rules do not fit nicely into the pri-
vate international law scheme. The concept which offers
most potential in this respect is that of ‘overriding man-
datory provisions’ as regulated in Article 9 Rome I. To
fully understand the possibilities and limits of Article 9
Rome I within the internal market, Article 9 will have to
be placed in the context of the right of free movement of
services. Both will be done in the next section.
3 Article 9 Rome I, the Free
Movement of Services and
the PWD
3.1 Overriding Mandatory Provisions in Article
9 Rome I
Article 9 Rome I Regulation contains a clause on over-
riding mandatory provisions. According to its first para-
graph, ‘Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions
the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country
for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political,
social or economic organisation, to such an extent that
they are applicable to any situation falling within their
scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the
contract under this Regulation.’ The predecessor of the
Rome I Regulation, the Rome Convention, contains
rules on overriding mandatory provisions in its Article
7. Though the provisions are not identical, the concept
‘of overriding mandatory provisions’ in both provisions
may be equated.79
The interpretation of Article 7 of the Rome Convention
was addressed in the recent Unamar case.80 In this case
the CJEU was asked whether the Belgian rules on the
protection of commercial agents qualified as overriding
mandatory provisions and, if they did, whether EU law
would allow application of those rules to agency con-
tracts that where otherwise governed by the law of
another EU Member State.81 In its judgment, the CJEU
allowed the courts of the Member States discretion to
override the otherwise applicable law in favour of man-
datory provisions of forum law in so far as it appears
that the national legislature adopted the latter provisions
in order to protect an interest judged to be essential by
the Member State concerned.82 It can be inferred from
the case law that the protection of agents could well be
such an essential interest.83 Likewise, it is to be expected
79. Beaumont and McEleavy, above n. 63, at 508.
80. CJEU 17 October 2013, C-184/12 (Unamar) , nyr. Case note: E.J.A.
Franssen, 302 Jurisprudentie arbeidsrecht (2013), 302 (NL).
81. The case is complicated by the fact that the Belgian law is in part based
on a European directive but extends the protection of the agent in sev-
eral ways. The relevant aspect here, was that the Belgian law also
applies to agents who trade in services rather than goods (a category
that falls outside the scope of the EU directive).
82. CJEU 17 October 2013, C-184/12 (Unamar), nyr, para. 50.
83. See CJEU 9 november 2000, C-381/98, ECR 2000 I-09305 (Ingmar).
165
Aukje A.H. van Hoek ELR November 2014 | No. 3
that the protection of workers, in principle, could be
deemed to have an overriding mandatory character.84
An indication thereof can be found in the fact that the
formulation of Article 9(1) Rome I was taken for the
Arblade case of the CJEU, a case which specifically dealt
with Belgian protective labour standards.85
Many labour law rules have an overriding mandatory
character, though the Member States traditionally draw
the line between lex causae rules and overriding man-
datory provisions differently.86 In Germany and the
Netherlands a distinction was made between rules that
offer mandatory contractual protection to a weaker party
(which were deemed to be part of lex causae) and rules
which have a public law character and/or protect a pub-
lic interest (which had an independent scope of applica-
tion). The two legal systems advocated a strict division
between the two categories: a rule would either totally
depend on the choice-of-law rule for its application or
have an independent scope rule which would determine
its international application in an exclusive manner.87
Belgium and France employed a much wider notion of
lois de police, under which most of their mandatory
labour protection would apply to work performed with-
in the territory. However, to some extent, the same rules
could also apply to contracts performed in another
country, as long as they were governed by Belgian or
French law. Accordingly, the division between the two
types of rules was less strict.88 In England a strict divi-
sion was made between common law protection (part of
lex causae) and protective statutes having their own
scope of application.89 The Unamar decision seems to
leave room for these differences – at least to some
extent.90 However, the judgment also makes clear (once
again) that within the internal market, the application of
84. Workers’ protection has been recognized in the case law on the internal
market as an overriding public interest which may justifies obstacles to
the free movement of services and the freedom of establishment. See
for example ECJ 23 November 1999, C-369/96, ECR 1999, I-8453
(Arblade) and ECJ 10 December 2007, C-438/05, ECR 2007, I-10779
(Viking).
85. ECJ 23 November 1999, C-369/96, ECR 1999, I-8453 (Arblade).
86. Beaumont and McEleavy, above n. 63, at 511 ff. For a description of
the different models of workers’ protection in the EU Member States,
see Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, above n. 4, at 22.
87. For Germany, see Deinert, above n. 31 at 186 and J. Nojack, 'Exclusiv-
normen im IPR', Studien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privat-
recht 152 (2005), at 107 ff.; for the Netherlands, see Strikwerda, above
n. 54, at 67-68 and Paul Vonken (ed.), Asser-Serie, International pri-
vaatrecht Deel I – Algemeen deel IPR (2013), at 406 and 412.
88. For Belgium, see A. Van Regenmortel, ‘Openbare orde en dwingend
recht: een confrontatie tussen de Europese en de Belgische invulling’, in
H. Verschueren and M.S. Houwerzijl (eds.), Toepasselijk arbeidsrecht
over de grenzen heen (2009), at 91-158, 120 ff.
89. Beaumont and McEleavy, above n. 63, at 113 ff.; Merrett, above n. 44,
at 242 ff.; L. Merrett, 'The Extra-Territorial Reach of Employment Legis-
lation’, 4 Industrial Law Journal 355-81 (2010); U. Grušić, ‘The Territo-
rial Scope of Employment Legislation and Choice of Law’, 75 Modern
Law Review 5, 722-51 (2012); Stone, above n. 63, at 359.
90. Mankowski, above n. 78, at 146-47. The English position seems most
problematic, as the distinction is based on legislative technique rather
than on policy grounds. See the authors cited in the previous note.
overriding mandatory provisions has to be in conformity
with the rules on free movement.91
3.2 Free Movement of Services and the
Application of Host State Rules to Posted
Workers
The application of overriding mandatory provisions of
the lex fori to contracts governed by foreign law does not
only compromise the harmonising effect of the Rome I
Regulation,92 it may also obstruct the market freedoms,
in particular the free movement of services as protected
by the TFEU. With regard to labour law, this has been
specifically acknowledged in the case law of the CJEU,
starting with the Rush Portuguesa decision of 1990.93 In
this case, the CJEU made a distinction between migrant
workers, who enter the labour market of the host state,
and posted workers, who generally do not. Posted work-
ers are workers who, while normally employed in a cer-
tain Member State, are temporarily posted to another
Member State to perform a service there. The employer
of a posted worker makes use of the free movement of
services. The worker does not need to avail himself of
the free movement of workers, because he is not deemed
to enter the labour market of the host state.94 This dis-
tinction is crucial in case the worker does not enjoy free
movement himself, e.g. because he is covered by a tran-
sitional regime. But the distinction also had an impact
on the labour law protection of the workers involved.
The underlying assumption in the case law on the free
movement of services is that workers who ordinarily
work in the country of establishment of their employer
will be covered by the law of their (employer’s) home
state, even when they are temporarily posted to another
state (the host state) to perform services there.
However, this causes a differentiation of employment
conditions applying to workers employed on the same
site. The local workers would be protected according to
local standards, whereas the posted workers would be
protected according to the standards of the home state.
This inequality in labour protection leads to a compara-
tive advantage for firms established in low-cost coun-
tries, which in turn may negatively affect the employ-
ment conditions in the host state (social dumping).
Accordingly, high-cost states might want to extend their
employment protection rules to all labour performed
within the territory. And in practice they did. Germany,
for example, adopted a special statute to ensure that
workers posted to Germany would enjoy a certain level
of minimum wage protection.95 However, general appli-
91. This was already stipulated in the Arblade case: ECJ 23 November
1999, C-369/96, ECR 1999, I-8453.
92. Compare CJEU 17 October 2013, C-184/12 (Unamar) , nyr, para. 51.
93. ECJ 27 March 1990, C-113/89, ECR 1990, I-1417 (Rush Portuguesa
Lda v. Office National d’Immigration).
94. This may be different when the worker is send abroad by a temporary
work agency: CJEU 10 February 2011, Joint Cases C-307/09, C-308/09
and C-309/09 ECR 2011, I-453 (Vicoplus).
95. The Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz (BGBl. I 227) was adopted in 1996. In
the Netherlands, the scope of the most relevant collective agreement
– the one for the construction sector – was adapted to include workers
posted to the Netherlands. Belgium and France already applied their
laws to work within the territory.
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cation of host state law would put the foreign service
provider at a disadvantage by obliging him to fulfil dou-
ble standards (both those of the home state and those of
the host state) as well as robbing him of the comparative
advantage described above. This, according to the
CJEU, constitutes an obstacle to the free provision of
services, which can only be justified under specific con-
ditions.96
As the very diverging interpretation of Article 7 Rome
Convention in the Member States led to legal uncertain-
ty, secondary legislation seemed necessary.97 However,
agreement was not reached easily.98 The posting of
workers in the context of the free provision of services
opposes the interests of host state providers and workers
to the interests of the company performing the cross-
border service (and sometimes even the interests of the
posted workers). But it also opposes the interests of
high-cost host states to those of low-cost sending
states.99 This makes the topic highly controversial.100
The PWD adopted in 1996 (before the accession to the
EU of the former Eastern European countries) tries to
balance the interest involved.
3.3 The PWD
The PWD applies to cross-border posting of workers in
the context of an intra-EU provision of services.101 The
directive covers different types of posting which are
described in Article 1 PWD and include service con-
tracts, intra-company transfers and temporary agency
work. Article 2 PWD defines a posted worker as a
‘worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work
in the territory of a Member State other than the State
in which he normally works’ – a phrase which mimics
(but is not identical to) the connecting factor of
Article 8(2) Rome I Regulation. The substantive protec-
tion of the PWD is contained in Article 3. This article
imposes a duty on the host state to extend its mandatory
labour protection in certain core areas of labour law to
workers who are temporarily posted to their territory in
96. See inter alia ECJ 23 November 1999, C-369/96, ECR 1999, I-8453
(Arblade) and ECJ 15 March 2001, C-165/98, ECR 2001, I-2189 (Maz-
zoleni).
97. The directive also regulates the enforcement of rights and contains a
special rule on jurisdiction.
98. On the history of the PWD see M.S. Houwerzijl, De Detacheringsricht-
lijn. Over de achtergrond, inhoud en implementatie van richtlijn
96/71/EG (2005).
99. M. Fornasier and M. Torga, ‘The Posting of Workers: Perspective of the
Sending State’, 6 Europäische Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 356-65, at
358 (2013).
100. The controversial character may also be deduced from the large number
of amendments (833) which were submitted for the draft report on the
enforcement directive of the committee on employment of the EP (pro-
cedure file 2012/0061/COD). A similar lively discussion took place in
the legislative procedure for the Services directive. In the final version,
employment conditions were specifically excluded from the home coun-
try control rule embedded therein: Directive 2006/123/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in
the internal market, OJ 2006, L 376/36–68, Article 3(1)(a), 3(2) and
recital 14.
101. The directive only regulates intra-EU provision of services. However,
Article 1(4) stipulates that ‘Undertakings established in a non-member
State must not be given more favourable treatment than undertakings
established in a Member State.’
the context of a cross-border provision of services. This
obligation provides a certain measure of fair competition
for all companies performing services within a given
state by laying a minimum threshold in the level of pro-
tection offered to the workers. The other articles of the
directive relate to exchange of information, enforce-
ment, implementation and review.
Article 3 is the heart of the posting directive. As descri-
bed, it ensures a minimum level of protection through
the mechanism of equal treatment of posted and local
workers. The directive does not compel states to intro-
duce certain types of protection, e.g. a statutory mini-
mum wage. However, when a Member State does offer
its own work force a specific protection, this protection
should also apply to posted workers. In other words, the
PWD does not harmonise the substantive law, but does
regulate the application thereof in international cases.
Because of this character, Article 3 PWD is deemed to
be a private international law provision which gives a
specific interpretation of Article 9 Rome I: all mandato-
ry rules in the areas of protection mentioned in Article 3
PWD (minimum wage, non-discrimination, safety and
health, maximum working time) must be considered to
apply as overriding mandatory protection to all workers
posted to the territory.102
However, the CJEU interpreted the PWD as to also
limit the application of host state labour law to the areas
mentioned in the directive, unless the rule to be applied
is considered to be part of public policy.103 In other
words, the PWD constitutes both the minimum and the
maximum rule on the application of host state law in the
context of intra-EU provision of services.
3.4 The Interaction between the PWD and the
Rome I Regulation
There is an uncertain factor though: the exact interac-
tion between the PWD and the Rome I Regulation has
yet to be clarified.104 Whereas the PWD, in the situa-
tions covered by it, clearly seems to limit the possibility
of host states to apply their local laws and regulations as
overriding mandatory provisions, it is less clear to what
extent the PWD would also limit the application of host
state law as the law applying by virtue of Article 8 Rome
I. The first sentence of Article 3(7) PWD allows the
Member States to offer better protection to posted
workers than the minimum provided for by the direc-
tive. The CJEU has interpreted this provision to refer
only to better protection offered by the law of the ‘coun-
try of origin’ – extension of protection by the host state
102. Beaumont and McEleavy, above n. 63, at 534; Vonken, above n. 87, at
450.
103. The directive also has an influence on the way the minimum level of
protection should be established – e.g. by law or generally applicable
collective agreement. Moreover, two provisions allow for additional
protection in case of employment through temporary work agencies.
104. Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, above n. 77, at 15-21.
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is not covered by it.105 Some authors infer a home coun-
try control rule from this case law, which would submit
the posted worker to the laws of the country of estab-
lishment of his employer and disallow the application of
more favourable provisions contained in the law applica-
ble by virtue of Article 8 of Rome I.106 A different read-
ing – and the one I adhere to – denies the existence of a
home country control rule with regard to employment
protection.107 In that view the ‘country of origin’ in the
court’s case law should be read to refer to the country in
which the work is normally or habitually performed,
rather than the country of establishment of the employ-
er.108 The law applying to the employment contract
under Article 8 of Rome I may be applied in full, even if
this law happens to be the law of the host state.
The discussion on the potentially limiting effect of the
PWD on the law applicable to the contract under Article
8 of Rome I is spawned to a large extent by the fact that
most Member States have not implemented the defini-
tions of posting and posted worker in their national
laws. They simply apply the rules on posting to all or
almost all cross-border service provisions.109 As a result,
also workers who do not normally perform their work in
the state of establishment of their employer, but rather
are hired for posting, are treated as ‘posted workers’ and
exempted from the protection of host state law.110 To
give but one example, in the Flamanville case Polish
workers were employed by the Cypriot establishment of
105. See in particular CJEU C-346/06 ECR 2008, I-1989, (Rüffert) para. 34.
The CJEU also allows the employer to voluntary improve the protection
of the workers by entering into collective agreements in the host state:
CJEU 18 December 2007, C-341/05, ECR 2007, I-11767 (Laval) paras.
80-81.
106. See e.g. F. van Overbeeke, ‘Over de interactie tussen het IPR en de
bepalingen inzake het vrij verkeer, toegespitst op internationale arbeid-
sovereenkomsten’, Rechtskundig Weekblad 643-53, at 648 ff. (2013);
Fornasier and Torga, above n. 99 at 364. Those authors draw a parallel
between this situation and that of the eDate decision of the CJEU 25
October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10. However, I would submit
there are crucial differences between the eDate scenario and the situa-
tion discussed here. See in more detail (with references): A.A.H. van
Hoek and M.S. Houwerzijl, ‘"Posting" and "Posted Workers": The
Need for Clear Definitions of Two Key Concepts of the Posting of
Workers Directive’, in C. Barnard, M. Gehring & I. Solanke (eds.), Cam-
bridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2012) 419-51.
107. Compare Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, above n. 106, at 441-43. Employ-
ment conditions are specifically excluded from coordinated field in the
Services directive: Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal
market, OJ 2006, L 376/ 36–68, Articles 3(1)(a), 3(2) and recital 14.
108. It should be kept in mind, though, that in most cases in which host state
law would apply by virtue of Article 8 Rome I, the worker would not
qualify as posted worker under Article 2 PWD. Compare Van Hoek and
Houwerzijl, above n. 106, at 424 and 448.
109. Van Hoek and Houwerzijl, above n. 4, at 74 ff.
110. Lisa Berntsen and Nathan Lillie, Organizing a Transnational Hyper-
Mobile Workforce in the Dutch Construction Sector, at 11 <www2. gre.
ac. uk/ _ _ data/ assets/ pdf_ file/ 0010/ 665740/ Lisa -Berntsen -and -Nathan -
Lillie. pdf>. For the difficulty of distinguishing genuine postings from
other types of labour mobility, see also Jan Cremers, 'In Search of
Cheap Labour in Europe: Working and Living Conditions of Posted
Workers', 6 CLR Studies, EFBW (2011), executive summary <www. clr -
news. org/ CLR -Studies/ Websummary. pdf>, Roberto Pedersini and Massi-
mo Pallini, 'Posted Workers in the European Union', Eurofound (2011),
13 <www. eurofound. europa. eu/ eiro/ studies/ tn0908038s/ tn0908038s_ 2.
htm>.
an Irish recruitment agency to work at a construction
site in France.111 In this case, the employer was per-
forming a cross-border provision of services. But the
workers were not posted in the meaning of either the
PWD or Article 8 Rome I; they may very well have been
covered by the law of the host state as lex causae.
The over-application of the PWD may be halted when
the directive on the enforcement of the PWD is imple-
mented.112 The enforcement directive inter alia contains
an operationalisation of the concepts of posting and pos-
ted worker, limiting the application of the PWD to sit-
uations of genuine posting. The clarification of the
scope of the PWD led to a discussion on the legal posi-
tion of workers employed in the context of cross-border
service provisions who do not fulfil the requirements of
a genuine posting. The parliamentary documents show a
three-fold opinion on this matter. Some MEPs advoca-
ted that host state law should apply in full. This position
supports the call for equal treatment between locally
hired and posted workers.113 Others advocated that a
comparison should be made between home state and
host state law, giving precedence to the law offering bet-
ter protection.114 Finally, the third opinion, which
turned into law at the adoption of the directive, refers to
the Rome I Regulation with regard to the issue of appli-
cable law.115 The exact implications of this latter posi-
tion for the interpretation of Articles 8 and 9 Rome I
Regulation are yet unclear, though.
For one, the debate in parliament and Council seems to
centre around the interaction between the PWD and
Article 8 Rome I. None of the amendments presented in
the debate in parliament specifically address the interac-
tion between the PWD and Article 9 Rome I. When
workers employed in a cross-border situation do not ful-
fil the definition of posting under the PWD, the host
state is not obliged to offer the protection specified
111. <www. eurofound. europa. eu/ eiro/ 2012/ 07/ articles/ fr1207031i. htm>;
<www. europarl. europa. eu/ sides/ getDoc. do ?pubRef= -/ / EP/ / TEXT+OQ+O
-2011 -000168+0+DOC+XML+V0/ / EN>
112. Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 on administrative coopera-
tion through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regula-
tion’) OJ 2014 L 159/11.
113. During the debate in Council it was suggested to apply host state law to
any worker not fulfilling the definition of posted worker as specified in
the Enforcement Directive. See debate in council 21/6/2012 and
6/12/2012, Procedure file 2012/0061/COD. Similar solutions were
proposed by members of the European Parliament. See e.g. amend-
ments 378, 388, 393, 201 and 402 accompanying the Draft report.
114. Compare Draft report, amendments nos. 384, 388 and 399. The Report
of the EP, 4 July 2013, PE 498.030v02-00 A70249/2013 (amendments
5 and 45) primarily refers to the law applying on the basis of the Rome I
Regulation, but seems to link interpretation thereof to an assessment
which law is most favourable to the posted workers.
115. See Report, amendments 5 and 45. The Commission proposal,
COM(2012)131final, specifies in recital 6 that the PWD ‘should not
prejudice the application of the law which, under Article 8 Rome I Reg-
ulation, applies to individual employment contracts’. Interim solutions
may call upon the Member State to jointly establish the applicable law
to the contract, or introduce an assumption that in cases of ‘non-genu-
ine posting’, the host state is the state in which the work is habitually
performed under Rome I: see Draft report, amendments 90 and 119.
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therein. However, the limitation to core issues and pub-
lic police does not apply either. Suppose a worker can
no longer be deemed to be a posted worker, because she
is not posted for a short period and is not expected to
return to the country of origin upon termination of the
cross-border service (the Schlecker scenario). What pro-
tection does this worker enjoy when, based on the wide
interpretation of the exception clause in Article 8 Rome
I, the law of the country of origin is applicable to the
employment contract as such? Similarly, the question
could be raised on the protection of workers in the
Flamanville scenario described above. The current
interpretation of Article 8 Rome I by the CJEU makes it
difficult to predict which law would apply to their con-
tracts. This puts pressure on the use of Article 9 Rome I
as a regulatory mechanism. In my opinion host state law
should at least provide the Flamanville workers with the
minimum protection offered by the PWD, in order to
avoid an unwanted lacuna in the protection of this group
of workers.116 However, as the maximum imposed by
the PWD does not apply either, the host state is free to
apply mandatory laws going beyond the core protection
of the PWD, provided the requirements of both Article
9 Rome I and – where necessary – the case law on the
treaty provisions regarding free movement are met.117
4 Some Conclusions
The CJEU has a very factual and case-specific approach
to the determination of the applicable law in employ-
ment disputes. The emphasis placed on the factual per-
formance of the contract is meant to protect the worker
by ensuring the application of a law which has a real
connection to the employment contract and/or the
social and economic environment in which the employee
operates. It counteracts the possibilities for ‘labour law
shopping’ which the free movement provisions of EU
law offer the employer. However, the factual character
of the assessment may have serious procedural draw-
backs for the employee as well as reducing legal certain-
ty. Moreover, the strictly individual character of the
choice-of-law process may hamper administrative and
collective enforcement of the rights of the workers
involved.
In the Schlecker case the CJEU prioritised the individual
assessment of the applicable law over more collective
concerns. By opening up the possibility to apply the law
of the country of the common origin of the parties even
in cases in which the contract has been performed for a
continuous and prolonged period in a single other coun-
try, the court seems to take position in the discussion
whether and to what extent the protection of ‘posted’
workers should be equal to the protection of workers
habitually working in the country of posting. By leaving
so much room for application of the law of the country
116. Compare Hof Den Bosch 28 May 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:CA1457,
JAR 2013/159, RAR 2013/160 (Mooy).
117. On the latter, see Pedersini and Pallini, above n. 110 at 19-20.
of (common) origin,118 the judgment stands in clear
opposition to the plea of the national and European
labour unions for equal treatment of all employees who
perform their work in a specific state.119
Both the factual and the individualised character of the
choice of law process diminish the aptitude of Article 8
Rome I as an instrument for the regulation of cross-
border labour mobility. This is remedied in part by
Article 9 – an article which specifically aims to protect
public interests and hence has a more regulatory goal.
Article 9 Rome I offers a point of entry for the overrid-
ing mandatory provisions of the state in which the work
is actually performed, in case foreign law applies to the
contract as such. However, the application of host state
law in the area of cross-border provision of services
within the EU is strictly regulated by the PWD.
The recently adopted Enforcement Directive will
reduce the role of the PWD to a situation of genuine
posting, in which the applicable law to the contract will
most likely be the law of the country of origin of the
service provider/employer. In those cases, private inter-
national law and internal market rules coincide. Outside
this ideal type of posting, however, the interaction
between the rules on the internal market and private
international law are still cause for confusion and
debate. As both areas of law are based on different logics
– the one taking the service provider as its starting point
and the other the individual contract of employ-
ment – this debate is unlikely to end with the Enforce-
ment Directive.
118. The CJEU does not refer to the country of origin. However, the refer-
ence to the tax and social security position of the worker in practice
does act as an indirect country of origin / home country control rule.
See also above.
119. On the opinion of the European Trade Union Confederation, see
<www. etuc. org/ r/ 909>; for the position of the Dutch trade union con-
federations, see <www. cnv. nl/ blog/ blog -post/ 2012/ 03/ 20/ detacherings
richtlijn -niet -scherp -genoeg/ >.
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